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The Interplay Between China’s Climate Policy and Other Development Goals
I.

Introduction

China has experienced rapid economic growth in the past several decades. Initially, this was
a consequence of China’s prioritization of economic development and industrialization over its
other development goals. However, this rapid growth has left considerable pollution and
environmental destruction in its wake. Shanghai, China’s largest city, illustrates this stark
conflict between economic advancement and environmental degradation. Shanghai boasts
sparkling skyscrapers and a population of nearly 26 million,1 yet its air is frequently choked with
smog due to pollution from nearby industry, including steel production.2 This paper explores the
interplay between China’s environmental policies and several conflicting development goals
through the institutional lens of China’s Five-Year Plans (FYPs). The National People’s
Congress, China’s national government, has been issuing FYPs—which announce China’s policy
goals—at regular intervals since the 1950s.
II.

Background

The past several decades have witnessed an increase in global emissions of greenhouse gases,
chief among which is carbon dioxide. In what is known as the greenhouse effect, these gases trap
heat in the atmosphere, increasing the planet’s surface temperatures.3 Thus far, the greenhouse
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effect has led to a 1.2◦C rise in average global temperatures since the late 1800s.4 Moreover, it
has already precipitated glacial melting, global sea level rise, changes in the frequency of
extreme weather effects, an increased spread of tropical diseases, and more alarming outcomes.5
As it emits more and more greenhouse gases, China plays an increasingly larger role in
furthering these global trends.
A. China’s Contribution to Global Climate Change
In 2014, China produced 30 percent of the world’s carbon dioxide emissions; meanwhile, the
United States, the second-highest emitter of carbon dioxide, produced 15 percent.6 In 2017, an
uptick in Chinese coal production drove global carbon dioxide emissions to increase by 2
percent, after global emissions had hardly risen from 2014–2016.7 As of 2005, China used 10
percent of the total energy consumed globally, and was projected to consume 15 percent of the
world’s total energy by 2025.8
Changes in China’s energy consumption have a significant impact on global greenhouse gas
emissions because China derives 74.8 percent of its electricity from coal, oil, and natural gas.
These three energy resources, known as “fossil fuels,” release carbon dioxide when they are
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burned to create energy.9 China’s increasing carbon dioxide emissions will likely prevent the
world from meeting its 2017 goal—outlined in the Paris Agreement—of limiting the rise in
global average surface temperatures to 2◦C above preindustrial values.10
B. Recent Global Climate Policy
In the 2016 Paris Agreement, 178 countries published “nationally determined contributions,”
which outlined each of their intended reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, with the ultimate
goal of limiting global temperature rise to 2◦C.11 In its nationally determined contribution, China
pledged to peak its carbon dioxide emissions by 2030, and to “increase the share of non-fossil
fuels in primary energy consumption to around 20 [percent],” among other goals.12 A recent
study showed that, if China sticks to its target emission reductions under the Paris Agreement,
which would involve annual carbon dioxide emission reductions of 4 percent, China could
prevent 94,000 deaths and avoid $339 billion in healthcare costs through 2030.13
III.

China’s Environmental Policies

Examining China’s FYPs sheds light on the trajectory of China’s environmental policy
throughout the past half-century. By setting forth many goals that are not environmental in
nature, these FYPs also illustrate how China’s other priorities have conflicted, and might still

9

Kelly Levin, Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Fossil Fuels and Cement Reach Highest Point in Human History,
World Resources Institute (Nov. 22, 2013), http://www.wri.org/blog/2013/11/carbon-dioxide-emissions-fossil-fuelsand-cement-reach-highest-point-human-history.
10
See The Paris Agreement, United Nations Climate Change, http://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-parisagreement/the-paris-agreement.
11
Id.
12
National Development & Reform Commission of China, Enhanced Actions on Climate Change: China’s Intended
Nationally Determined Contributions (June 30, 2015),
http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/China/1/China's%20INDC%20%20on%2030%20June%202015.pdf.
13
Jennifer Chu, Study: Health Benefits Will Offset Cost of China’s Climate Policy, MIT News (Apr. 23, 2018),
http://news.mit.edu/2018/study-health-benefits-will-offset-cost-china-climate-policy-0423.

3

conflict, with its goals in the environmental arena. This conflict is especially apparent in China’s
climate policy. As in every nation, economic growth in China has been largely powered by fossil
fuels, so the achievement of China’s economic goals could plausibly hinder China’s ability to
meet its climate-related aspirations.
A. China’s Institution of FYPs
Thus far, China has proven to be one of the world’s fastest-developing economies. To a large
extent, China’s growth is planned, assisted, and monitored by its central government. The
National People’s Congress periodically releases FYPs, which outline a variety of benchmarks
that China intends to meet during each five-year period. Whereas these plans are not legally
binding, they often inform the development of China’s binding laws and regulations.14
Additionally, since 2011, China’s FYPs have distinguished between binding and expected
targets: “local officials must meet [binding targets] in order to advance their career,” whereas
expected targets are more optional.15 These plans trace changes in China’s environmental
goals—which increased in quantity and stringency over time—as well as China’s overall
development goals, which often stand in direct conflict with its environmental aspirations.
B. China’s Early FYPs
The National People’s Congress’ first FYP was designed to cover the period from 1953–57.
The government’s goals for this period included increasing the state’s ownership of businesses
that were in the private sector, increasing the share of industry relative to agriculture in the
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Chinese economy, and increasing the output of iron, steel, cement, and food crops, among other
goods. One of China’s goals involved drastically expanding the country’s coal production, from
31 million metric tons in 1949 to a planned 113 million metric tons in 1957. China’s first FYP
not only failed to communicate goals for environmental preservation, but also called for a nearquadrupling of China’s coal production within the course of eight years.16 China’s second FYP
similarly reflected an intent to increase its industrial and agricultural development, without
declaring any environmental goals.17
C. FYPs Addressing Environmental Goals
China’s Third through Eighth FYPs resembled its First and Second FYPs in setting forth
economic and social goals without referring to natural resources or environmental quality. It was
not until China’s Ninth FYP that this institution began articulating environmental goals,
beginning with intended pollution reductions and moving toward targets for mitigating climate
change by reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
1. China’s Ninth FYP
The Ninth FYP, which extended from 1996–2000, is notable for introducing China’s goal of
“total emissions control.” This involved setting forth quantitative emission reduction goals for 12
different pollutants across China’s provinces. Under this policy, some provinces and cities were
permitted to increase their emissions up to a certain limit, whereas others were instructed to
reduce their emissions.
2. China’s Tenth FYP
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China’s Tenth FYP, which covered the period from 2001–2005, announced that China would
continue its policy of sustainable development, through facilitating family planning programs,
protecting natural resources, and strengthening environmental protection. More specifically, the
FYP expressed China’s desire to create reserves for minerals, conserve marine resources,
increase recycling programs, protect forests and grasslands from desertification, reduce
pollution, and decrease the incidence of natural disasters.18 With regard to emissions, China
declared its goal of reducing sulfur dioxide emissions—which contribute to acid rain and human
health issues, but not to climate change—by 10 percent below 2000 levels by 2005.19
3. China’s Eleventh FYP
In National Development and Reform Commission Chairman Ma Kai’s announcement on the
Eleventh FYP, Kai referenced the “increasingly prominent contradiction between economic
growth and resources and environment constraints.” In light of that contradiction, this FYP
called for improving environmental protection, better managing China’s resources, and
“build[ing] a cycling and sustainable national economic system featuring low input, high output,
low consumption and emission.”20 Specifically, the Eleventh FYP called for a decrease in
China’s energy intensity—its energy output as a fraction of its GDP—of 20 percent by 2010, the
end of the eleventh five-year period.
China designed its Top 1,000 Energy-Consuming Enterprises program in an effort to meet
the goals outlined in its Eleventh FYP. This program set energy consumption targets for China’s
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1,000 largest industrial entities,21 which consumed 33 percent of the country’s energy in 2004. A
2010 evaluation of the program concluded that it would likely bring China only 10–25 percent of
the way toward its goal of a 20 percent reduction in energy intensity by 2010.22 Another study of
the program, discussed at a Harvard-China Project event in 2018, revealed “little effects of the
Top-1000 policy on firms’ energy-saving behavior” and “insignificant productivity changes in
the firms covered by the Top-1000 program.”23 Regardless of this ostensible failure of the Top
1,000 Program to meet its goals, China reportedly ended this five-year period with a 19.1 percent
reduction in its energy intensity, nearly meeting its goal of 20 percent.24
In 2009, during the period of the Eleventh FYP, China announced that it intended to decrease
its carbon intensity 40-45 percent below 2005 levels by 2020. This announcement was part of the
Copenhagen Accord, a set of nonbinding emission-reduction pledges made by most countries. In
the Copenhagen Accord, China also pledged to acquire 15 percent of its primary energy
consumption from non-fossil fuels by 2020, and to increase its forest coverage.25
4. China’s Twelfth FYP
China’s Twelfth FYP continued the Eleventh FYP’s trend of communicating specific metrics
for improving environmental quality. By the end of the Twelfth five-year period, which extended
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from 2011–2015, the Chinese government intended for non–fossil fuel sources of energy to
comprise 11.4 percent of China’s primary energy consumption; China’s water consumption per
unit of value-added industrial output to decrease by 30 percent; its energy consumed per unit of
GDP to decrease by 16 percent; its carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP to decrease by 17
percent; and its forest coverage to increase to 21.66 percent.26 Chinese reports showed that the
government mostly met these goals. The Chinese government reportedly exceeded its goal for
reducing its energy intensity, reaching an 18.2 percent decrease in energy intensity rather than
the aspirational 16 percent decrease in this metric.27
In its Twelfth FYP, the National People’s Congress also announced its desire to form a
market for trading carbon.28 Implementing a cap-and-trade system generally involves setting a
limit on overall emissions in a certain geographic area, allocating permits—which each allow a
given quantity of pollution—among the entities in that area, and enabling those entities to trade
permits amongst themselves. If China does implement a cap-and-trade system to reduce carbon
emissions, it would be joining the ranks of several other countries and U.S. states with programs
of that nature.29
5. China’s Thirteenth FYP
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China’s Thirteenth FYP, which extends from 2016–2020, declared a policy of green growth
and set forth 10 binding targets related to environmental protection, out of a total of 25 targets.
These targets included at least an 80 percent increase in the ratio of good air quality days in large
cities; improvements in surface water quality and water consumption; and an increase in forest
coverage.

The FYP also included several climate-related goals. First, China aims to decrease its energy
intensity by 15 percent below 2015 levels, and to decrease its carbon intensity—or carbon
emissions per unit of GDP—by 18 percent below 2015 levels. China also now has its first-ever
cap on total energy use during the FYP period: it cannot burn more than five billion tons of coal
within these five years. China is also aiming to derive 15 percent of its national energy
consumption from green sources, and to invest billions of yuan in hydropower, wind, solar,
biomass, biogas, and geothermal sources of energy generation. The government pledged to
support green industries, including clean energy vehicles and energy-saving technologies. One
challenge that remains, apart from challenges in enforcement, is that infrastructure is still being
built in China that supports fossil fuel combustion. For example, China approved the
construction of 210 coal plants in 2015 alone.30

The FYP also set out aspirational percent reductions for several specific pollutants, including
sulfur dioxide, ammonia nitrogen, and nitrous oxides. The Thirteenth FYP imposed slightly
stricter restrictions on those pollutants than did the Twelfth FYP, which was the first FYP to
address those specific pollutants.31
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IV.

Other Environmental Institutions and Developments

Over time, China has amassed a range of statutes addressing climate change and other
environmental issues, and has experienced unmatched growth in its renewable energy industry.
These advancements can assist China in meeting the environmental goals in its FYPs.
A. China’s Legislation on Climate Change
China’s first concrete action on the environment can be traced back to 1974, when the
National People’s Congress amended the Chinese Constitution to add a provision saying that
“the state protects and improves the living environment and the ecological environment, and
prevents and remedies pollution and other public hazards.” Today, a set of laws govern China’s
environmental quality, including the Environmental Protection Law, which requires certain
departments of the federal, provincial, and municipal governments to issue Environmental
Impact Assessments in planning and construction decisions; the Water Pollution Law, which sets
water quality standards for different categories of surface water; the Air Pollution Law, which
designates air quality standards for certain pollutants and facilities; and the Circular Economy
Law, which aims to support reduction, reuse and recycling in the process of production,
circulation and consumption of goods; among many other laws.32
China has also put programs in place to promote green businesses. These programs include a
green credit policy, which limits businesses’ access to financial credit if they violate
environmental laws; a green trade policy, which bans exporters that violate environmental
protection laws; a green security policy, which imposes requirements on environmentally
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harmful companies that want to list their securities on an exchange; and a mandatory liability
insurance requirement for companies.33
At the federal level, the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) is primarily responsible
for implementing China’s environmental policies, but other agencies with a role in
environmental protection include the Ministry of Water Resources, the Ministry of Land and
Resources, the State Oceanic Administration, and the State Forestry Administration.34
B. Environmental Enforcement in China

The Twelfth FYP provided for the installation of over 1,400 air quality monitoring stations
throughout China. The Thirteenth FYP called for an increase in data from sources such as ground
pollution surveys and a water monitoring system, in order to assist the government in monitoring
pollution and enforcing environmental laws.35

According to the U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission, lax enforcement
will pose a major challenge to China’s goal of reaching the Thirteenth FYP’s benchmarks.
According to the Commission’s report, local government officials are more likely to be promoted
if they concentrate on improving economic conditions, and they often fear that implementing
environmentally protective measures will reduce jobs and economic growth in their respective
localities.36
China’s MEP has the authority to enforce its environmental laws by distributing inspection
teams across China and placing fines on polluters whose emissions exceed lawful limits. May
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2016 stands out as an illustration of the potential consequences of flouting environmental laws:
in that month alone, the MEP levied over 45.3 million yuan worth of fines, and required 230
plants to cease production due to emissions violations. However, even widespread enforcement
measures such as those might fail to achieve the FYPs’ goals. As Ma Jun, director of the Institute
of Public and Environmental Affairs, explained, the government does not know “if in reality the
fine will be paid,” as polluting “is still cheaper than the cost of compliance,” and many polluters
“are the darlings of local government, which gives them protection.”37
C. China’s Recent Shift Toward Renewables
Although China is the chief emitter of greenhouse gases, the country has recently made
headlines for adopting renewable energy technologies at unprecedented rates. In January of
2017, the Chinese government unveiled a directive calling for the cancellation of 103 coal-fired
power plants that were under construction, 38 and announced its intention to invest 2.5 trillion
yuan in the renewable energy sector.39 Last year, China boasted 3.5 million jobs in the renewable
energy sector and exported half of the world’s wind turbines and two-thirds of the world’s solar
panels.40
China is now home to a range of clean energy innovations. Near Huainan city lies the
world’s largest floating solar farm: a collection of solar panels situated on a lake, which sits atop
a flooded coal mine. This farm’s 166,000 solar panels generate enough electricity to power an
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entire town.41 Another recent innovation took the form of two solar-powered roads, one in
Zhejiang Province and one in the city of Jinan. These roads were equipped with a layer of silicon
solar panels covered by a layer of transparent concrete, which protected the panels from the cars
driving over them.42
However, China is wasting a substantial proportion of the renewable energy that it recently
put in place. According to Time Magazine, China wastes 21 percent of the electricity generated
by its wind turbines and 11 percent of the electricity generated by its solar power sources.43
V.

Conflicting Development Goals

Beginning with China’s first FYP, these policy pronouncements have displayed a focus on
economic growth and expanding Chinese industries. Even China’s recent FYPs that began
emphasizing environmental protection also call for many goals whose resolution could conflict
with such protection. The Thirteenth FYP provides a case study in a range of goals that, if
achieved, could directly impede China’s ability to meet its greenhouse gas emission targets.
These goals include shifting to higher value-added manufacturing, increasing urbanization,
promoting openness, and increasing the country’s standard of living.
China’s goal of shifting resources toward higher value-added manufacturing involves
promoting the development of Internet services, e-commerce, biomedical advances, and other
high-tech instruments.44 A shift from more of an industrial economy to more of a service-based
economy would dovetail with China’s emission-reduction goals if it involves a reduction in high-
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emitting facilities, which tend to be associated with low-value manufacturing processes.45
Already, a decrease in energy-intensive, low-value manufacturing caused “the growth of carbon
emissions generated in the manufacture of Chinese exports [to have] slowed or reversed.”46
China aims to achieve its goal of promoting urbanization through increasing urban housing
units and providing individuals with incentives to move from rural areas to cities.47 The effect of
urbanization on greenhouse gas emissions is ambiguous. Globally, increasing urbanization is
projected to “contribute more than [a] 25 [percent] increase” in greenhouse gas emissions in the
twenty-first century. However, on a more regional scale, urbanization can reduce emissions “by
improving the efficiency of public infrastructure.” In China, a recent study reveals a positive
elasticity—which means that an increase in urbanization corresponds with a rise in emissions—
in some areas, and a negative elasticity—or a reduction in emissions accompanying an increase
in urbanization—in others. The former trend tends to arise when rural areas are less developed
and emit relatively few greenhouse gases. The latter trend arises in more developed areas, in
which cities tend to have energy-efficient public infrastructure.48
China’s goal of promoting openness involves increasing China’s exports, increasing imports
in certain areas, and promoting the “One Belt, One Road” initiative. This initiative aims to
facilitate the transport of natural resources across the nation, which will assist in developing
areas within China’s interior.49 Given that both the transportation of goods and the increase of

45

Jing Meng, et al., The Rise of South-South Trade and Its Effect on Global CO2 Emissions, 9 Nature Comm. 1
(2018).
46
Michael Taylor, China, India Outsource Emissions, Risking Climate Goal – Study, Reuters (May 14, 2018),
http://news.trust.org/item/20180514114558-1sio1.
47
Koleski, The 13th Five-Year Plan, supra note 15.
48
Yonghong Liu, The Impact of Urbanization on GHG Emissions in China: The Role of Population Density, 157 J.
Cleaner Prod. 299 (2017).
49
Katherine Koleski, The 13th Five-Year Plan, supra note 15.

14

living standards entail more greenhouse gas emissions, achieving these goals is likely to directly
undermine China’s efforts to attain the climate goals in its Thirteenth FYP.
Lastly, China intends to reach its goal of increasing living standards by providing subsidies
to individuals living in extreme poverty in both rural and urban areas. China also intends to relax
its family planning policy, known as the “one child policy,” which is predicted to increase the
nation’s population from 1.38 billion in 2015 to approximately 1.42 billion in 2020.50 The
combination of these policies is likely to hinder China’s ability to reach its climate goals.
Increased living standards tend to trigger increased emissions, and a higher population will
necessarily consume more resources and use more energy than China’s current population. As
long as a portion of China’s energy continues to derive from fossil fuel sources, these changes
would cut against the Thirteenth FYP’s greenhouse gas emission–reduction goals.
VI.

Conclusion
Entire volumes could be written on the intricacies of China’s FYPs, the policies and laws

that the recent FYPs are likely to motivate, and the projected environmental impacts of these
policies. This paper provided a cursory overview of the institution of FYPs and a brief
illustration of how the goals outlined in these FYPs can be inherently contradictory. In any
nation, the achievement of certain goals will necessarily obstruct the attainment of others.
Nevertheless, despite its ubiquity, it is important for China to keep this inherent contradiction in
mind when charting the path of its future development.
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